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Abstract
After deriving a model describing the law of evolution of innovators and imitators
the article focuses on their relationships under two di¤erent scenarios: prey-predator, in
which innovators are regarded as preys, and competing species. Analytic results show
that among the feasible equilibria the coexistence equilibrium is the only stable equilib-
rium under the rst scenario. We also nd conditions on the parameters allowing local
stability of the coexistence equilibrium in the second scenario. Such conditions imply
the existence of an inverse-U shaped relationship between innovation and imitation.
Keywords: imitation, innovation, intellectual property rights, Lotka-Volterra system
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The controversial issue of protection of intellectual property rights, IPR, or more generally
innovation, has been long debated and actually it does not seem to come at an end. The
major reason of controversy emerges because of the presence of a trade-o¤ that the govern-
ment faces when has to decide the IPR degree of protection. In turn, the trade-o¤ emerges
from the public good nature of ideas.
At one extreme of the trade-o¤ there are the alleged benets that IPR convey to society
by preventing possible underinvestment, thereby fostering economic growth. In particular,
stronger IPR are said to stimulate innovation by protecting innovators from imitation. In-
deed, many countries have put into place more e¤ective or rigorous protection policies, such
as the establishment of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit by US Congress and
the EU directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
At the other extreme, enhanced protection can have negative e¤ects on growth by creat-
ing monopolies. Many works indicates that the relationship between IPR protection and
economic growth is actually not so clear. Helpman (1993) allowing for exogenous imitation
with an innovative country and an imitative country shows that strengthening IPR in an
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imitative country does not necessarily stimulate innovations in innovative country in the
long run. More recently, Horii and Iwaisako (2007) use the average growth rate from 1966 to
2000 of some countries to indicate that it is di¢ cult to nd a positive relationship between
IPR protection and the growth rate, and Gould and Gruden (1996) show a positive but
weakrelationship between them. To explain this fact, Horii and Iwaisako (2007) construct
a quality ladder model where strengthened protection can depress the incentive to innovate.
Koléda (2005) shows that the e¤ect of patent novelty requirements on growth can be inverse-
U shaped, which implies that tightening the IPR protection dampens economic growth for
a range of stronger novelty requirements. Similarly, Furukawa (2007) presents a mechanism
through which stronger IPR protection depresses economic growth by focusing on learning
by experience. More specically, under some circumstances, the rate of innovation has an
inverse-U shape as a function of imitation, which is an inverse measure of IPR protection.
This theoretical nding is also supported by Aghion et al. (2005) who nd strong evidence
of an inverted-U relationships between competition and innovation. At its very essence this
strand of the literature implies that relaxing IPR can be a growth enhancing policy.
One of the way followed in the literature to model the degree of IPR protection is to intro-
duce imitation via an exogenous imitation rate, competing with innovation (Helpman 1993,
Lai 1998, Cysne and Turchick 2012). In this paper we take the stance of modelling the
relationships between innovation and imitation from a behavioral point of view. Imitation
is regarded as speeding up the rate of innovation di¤usion and is an inverse measure of IPR
protection. Tse (2002) shows that a longer di¤usion lag, while improving the appropriability
of R&D investment, lowers the productivity of R&D. There is thus a fundamental conict
between productivity and appropriability of R&D investment. A timely knowledge di¤u-
sion is important at least for two reasons. First, consumers can access new or qualitatively
improved products. Second, with a substantial lag length rms may only access the less
updated knowledge embodied in the older blueprints produced by others. As a result, a
slow di¤usion hampers the birth rate of innovation itself1.
In our view imitation can accidentally mitigate the di¤usion lag. In the model innovators
and imitators are regarded as competing for the same asset and entry the market requires
undergoing sunk costs. Expanding the methodology proposed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
we derive the dynamics of innovators and imitators in the market under two di¤erent sce-
narios: prey-predator, in which innovators are regarded as preys, and competition. More
precisely, we derive the joint dynamics of imitators and innovators as a Lotka-Volterra sys-
tem. The scenarios are then obtained through an appropriate selection of the variation range
of the parameters of the system. Analytical results show that among the feasible equilibria
the coexistence equilibrium -i.e.: the equilibrium associated to the simultaneous existence
of innovators and imitators in the long run - is the only stable under the prey-predator
scenario. While, in case of competition, the coexistence equilibrium is the unique locally
stable if the IPR degree of protection lies in an interval. The results are in line with the
literature claiming that stronger IPR protection is not always the best possible choice and
conrm the inverse-U shaped relationship between innovation and competition.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the set up of the model. The
derivation of innovators and imitators entry rates follow in Section 3 and the solution of
the system is presented in Section 4. Section 5 and 6 analyze the case of prey-predator and
competing species, respectively, analytically and numerically. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
1Caballero and Ja¤e (1993) estimate that the median lag between a cited patent and the citing patent is
9-10 years.
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2 The model
Consider an industry composed of Q rms that can be either innovators or imitators. Any
one rms inverse demand function is of the type:
Pt = YtD(Q); t > 0; (1)
where Pt is the price faced by the rm at time t, D is the demand function and it is
assumed to be decreasing with respect to Q so that the price falls if, caeteris paribus,
the number of innovators and/or imitators increases, consistently with both the increase
in aggregate supply and in competition. Yt can be interpreted as an idiosyncratic demand
shock ultimately capturing a shift to protability at time t. It can be thought of as reecting
random uctuations of taste or a technology shock. The important point is that such a shock
can be the source of a competitive advantage that allows new entrants to act as innovators,
either because they are innovators themselves, or because they imitate innovators, and enter
the industry.
By paying an entry cost R, any rm can get an initial draw Y0 of its demand shock Yt from
a known distribution. Thereafter fYtgt>0 will follow a geometric Brownian motion process
that is rm-specic, or independent across rms:
dYt = Ytdt+ Ytdzt t > 0; (2)
where fztgt>0 is a standard Brownian motion while  2 R and  > 0 represent the drift
and the di¤usion rate of the stochastic process fYtgt>0, respectively. Furthermore, we will
also assume that each rm can start actual operation by paying a further investment cost
I.
After the payment of the cost R, a rm observes the value Y0. If Y0 exceeds a critical thresh-
old Y (N), the rm pays the investment cost I and becomes an active producer. Otherwise
it lets fYtgt>0 evolve and activates if and when Y (N) is reached.
Example 1. As an illustrative example, R can be representative of a situation where a
pharmaceutical company can develop a new drug by incurring the research cost. The rm
patents the drug, but unless the prot estimate is su¢ ciently high, it will not incur the
additional investment expenditure I that is necessary to begin production.
Analogously, imitators can be thought of as incurring a xed investment cost, K, for
research and imitation in order to enter the market and appropriate a share of the innovators
income. The activation decision is made when the expected income randomly uctuating
reaches a threshold, Y (M), that is proportional to K2.
Let us denote as Nt, Mt the number of innovators and imitators at time t that will reach
the activation decision, respectively. Moreover, let us assume that a Poisson death process3
at rate  ensures that the number of rms is constant in the long run, i.e. N +M must
equal Q. Following the method elaborated by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) it is possible to
determine the rate at which N and M enter the market. This method is based on the idea
that for industry equilibrium only the total number of rms in various states matter, i.e.
how many are active, and how many are waiting for Y (N) or Y (M).
2One of the main results of the real options literature is to prove the inadequacy of the Net Present Value
criteria, NPV, for the decision to invest under uncertainty when xed costs must be incurred. In this case,
the hurdle rate is greater than that required by the NPV and the critical entry point in terms of expected
future gain is a multiple of xed costs. Such a critical value increases as uncertainty surrounding the gain
from investment increases, , and decreases as the expected growth rate  of the gain increases.
3By death or mortality rate it is meant the rate at which rms exit the market.
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3 Derivation of the entry rates
This section derives the rates at which innovators and imitators activate. We adopt and
extend to our case the methodology proposed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
Let us dene the process fwtgt>0 = flog(Yt)gt>0 and the threshold w(N) = log(Y (N)), where
fYtgt>0 is a geometric Brownian motion as in (2). Applying Itos lemma it can be easily
veried that the dynamics of fwtgt>0 follows a Brownian motion of the type
dwt = dt+ dz; t > 0;
with  =    22 . Let us start with the innovation problem and consider the case of N
would-be innovators. Let g(w) be the density function of the initial value w0 of fwtgt0
and G(w) the corresponding distribution function, with w 2 R.
The agents who are candidates for the innovation are distributed continuously between the
(log of the) minimum value of the expected gain -i.e.: 0- and the (log of the) innovation
threshold value -i.e.: Y (N). Hence, the agents are distributed in the interval ( 1; w(N)].
Now, let us introduce the function  : ( 1; w(N)]! (0; 1] such that N 0t(w) is the density
of these agents at location w, where N 0t =
dNt
dt , being dNt and dt small variations of Nt and
t, respectively. For notational simplicity we will omit the index t hereafter.
For the density to be stable over time, we must have that the agents leaving (to the right)
the location because of payo¤ increases be exactly counterbalanced by agents arriving in
the location because of payo¤ decreases. In order to formalize this condition, we denote as
dh = 
p
dt a small variation of net gain w. Some of the rms located in dh will die by a
proportion dt. Among the survivors, a fraction p will move to the right, i.e. will activate,
and a fraction 1  p will move to the left, i.e. will exit the market. The parameter p can be
found using the binomial approximation of the Brownian motion, namely p = 12

1 + 
p
dt


.
Therefore, the stability condition can be written as follows:
N 0(w)dh = N 0dt g(w)dh+p(1 dt) N 0(w dh)dh+(1 p)(1 dt) N 0(w+dh) dh (3)
Rearranging the terms of (3) and using a Taylor expansion, expression (3) becomes a dif-
ferential equation with constant coe¢ cients and variable term:
2
2
00(w)  0(w)  (w) + g(w) = 0: (4)
The general solution of equation (4) is of the type:
(w) = C1 exp(b1w) + C2 exp(b2w) + 0(w) (5)
where C1 and C2 will be pinned down, as we will see shortly, through the fullment of some
boundary conditions and b1 and b2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
2
2
b2   b   = 0; (6)
i.e.:
b1 =
 +
p
2 + 22
2
> 0; b2 =
  
p
2 + 22
2
< 0
while 0 is a particular solution to the di¤erential equation in (4), and it vanishes as
w !  1.
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For analytical tractability, let us assume now that the distribution of the initial payo¤,
Y0, is uniform over a range (0; Y ). In this case, the logarithm of the initial payo¤, w0,
is distributed according to an exponential function: g(w) = exp(w   w) = G(w), with
w = log(Y ), meaning that the initial draw of fwtgt>0 is taken from an exponential
random variable. In this case, it can be easily veried that a specic solution 0 is given
by:
0(w) =
exp(w   w)
+    22
(7)
with 
2
2 < +  to make economic sense. This condition, along with 
2 > , implies the
positive root of the quadratic expression to be greater than unity, b1 > 1; a condition that
we will always assume. The denition of  provides us with the boundary conditions, that
are: 8><>:
lim
w! 1(w) = 0;
(w(N)) = 0:
(8)
The rst line in (8) is a simple restatement of the fact that a probability distribution function
takes value zero at its lower limit. The second line is due to the fact that the mass of waiting
rms is zero at the entry threshold. By exploiting the boundary conditions in (8) we can
determine the two constants as:8>><>>:
C2 = 0;
C1 =   exp[w
(N)(1 b1) w]
+ 2
2
 : (9)
By substituting (7) and (9) into (5) we nally get the denite solution of the di¤erential
equation, i.e.:
(w) =  exp

w(N)(1  b1)  w + b1w
  exp(w   w)
+    22
 : (10)
The rate of activation of the innovators is the rate at which waiting rms hit w(N). This
is given by the fraction p(1   dt) of the rms located just at the left of w(N). Using a
Taylor expansion and by using (7), (8) and (10), we obtain:
1
2
N 0
h
(w(N))  0(w(N))dh
i
dh =  1
2
N 00(w(N))(dh)2 =
=  
2
2
N 00(w(N))dt = N 0
2
2 (b1   1)
+    22
 exp(w(N)   w); (11)
being the last term equal to the rate of activation, since these rms activate in the time
interval dt.
The smaller the entry threshold for innovation, the smaller the number of rms waiting to
enter. In the special case in which the threshold is zero, in particular, the rate of entry will
be a minimum, since all rms will have already entered and no rm would be to the left of
the entry threshold. Conversely, in the case in which the threshold is equal to the upper
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bound of the range, the number of waiting rms will be a maximum and equal to N (all
rms will be to the left of the threshold).
For a stationary population the total number of exits must equate the number of entries.
The latter is given by the sum of those rms who nd their w0 greater than the entry
threshold, N 0[(1   G(w(N))], plus the activation ow found in (11). Therefore we must
have:
N = N 0

1 G(w(N))  
2
2
0(w(N))

= N 0
241  exp(w(N)   w) +    22 b1
+    22

35 : (12)
For notational convenience, we dene _n  N 0N and _m  M
0
M . Solving for _n yields:
_n =


+    22


+    22

  e(w(N) w)

+    22 b1
 =  
   Y (N)Y 
(13)
with
  

+    22


+    22 b1
 > 1
Using a similar method for M imitators, assuming a uniform distribution over the range
w(M)   w we can conclude that their relative rate of entry is:
_m =


+    22


+    22

  Y (M)Y 

+    22 b1
 =  
   Y (M)Y 
(14)
From (13) and (14) appears clearly that the rates of entry are non-linear positive functions
of the thresholds Y (N) and Y (M), respectively of innovators and imitators, d _n
dY (N)
> 0;
d _m
dY (M)
> 0.
It is worth highlighting that the thresholds Y (N) and Y (M) cannot be independent from
the number of competitors, both innovators and imitators. Therefore, we can write Y (N) =
Y (N)(N;M), Y (M) = Y (M)(N;M). Taking a rst order Taylor expansion of _n and _m around
an arbitrary point (N0;M0) equations (13) and (14) can be rewritten as:
8<:
_n = _n jM=M0;N=N0 + d _ndN jM=M0;N=N0 (N  N0) + d _ndM jM=M0;N=N0 (M  M0)
_m = _m jM=M0;N=N0 +d _mdN jM=M0;N=N0 (N  N0) + d _mdM jM=M0;N=N0 (M  M0):
(15)
By applying the chain rule d _ndN =
@ _n
@Y (N)
@Y (N)
@N ;
d _n
dM =
@ _n
@Y (N)
@Y (N)
@M into the Taylor expansion
for _n in (15), we obtain:
_n = _n0 +
@ _n
@Y (N)
"
@Y (N)
@N
(N  N0) + @Y
(N)
@M
(M  M0)
#
=
= _n0   @ _n
@Y (N)
 
@Y (N)
@N
N0 +
@Y (N)
@M
M0
!
+
@ _n
@Y (N)
 
@Y (N)
@N
N +
@Y (N)
@M
M
!
; (16)
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where _n0  _n jM=M0;N=N0 and recalling that both the partial and the total derivatives are
evaluated at the expansion point.
In order to avoid an explosive growth rate, from an economic point of view, it is reasonable
to assume that d _ndN  0. In turn, by (13) this implies @Y
(N)
@N  0, and thus we have found
that the innovators entry threshold is negatively related to the total number of active
innovators. Put another way: the lower the threshold, the smaller the number of rms
waiting to enter. This is consistent with the fact that new entrants are willing to accept
a lower perspective prot when competition is more severe. As naturally imitators are
detrimental to innovators, we must assume that d _ndM  0, and it follows that @Y
(N)
@M  0.
Similarly, to avoid the imitators growth rate to go o¤ d _mdM  0 is required, which implies
@Y (M)
@M  0. Hereafter, we propose two alternative scenarios. In the rst one, we consider
that, as imitators thrive imitating, their entry rate must be a positive function of the number
of active innovators. Hence, we assume that d _mdN  0 which implies @Y
(M)
@N  0. Thereby,
equation (16) can be rewritten as
_n = _n0  

d _n
dN
N0 +
d _n
dM
M0

| {z }
nonnegative
+
d _n
dN|{z}
nonpositive
N +
d _n
dM|{z}
nonpositive
M (17)
and
_m = _m0  

d _m
dN
N0 +
d _m
dM
M0

| {z }
undetermined
+
d _m
dN|{z}
nonnegative
N +
d _m
dM|{z}
nonpositive
M (18)
8<:
N 0
N = r   sN   fM
M 0
M = g + cN   eM
(19)
with r  _n0  
 
d _n
dNN0 +
d _n
dMM0

> 0 ; s    d _ndN > 0; f    d _ndM > 0; e    d _mdM > 0 and,
nally c  d _mdN and g  _m0  
 
d _m
dNN0 +
d _m
dMM0

that can be either positive or negative.
Equations in (19) can be stated as indicating that the rates are function of both the number
of innovators and the number of imitators. Such a dependence shows how the evolution of
one of the two populations is intrinsically connected to the dynamics of the other. Therefore,
in studying the evolution of the two groups one must take into account how they interact.
At a closer look (19) resembles very much to the prey-predator model elaborated by Volterra
(1926) and popularized by Lotka (1956).
The canonical Lotka-Volterra system states that in each period innovators increase by a
proportion of r and, at the same time, die out by natural deathby a quadratic proportion
 sN2t . If we consider the number of patents issued at any one time as proxy for the number
of innovators, the quadratic term  sN2t captures the high mortality rate reported by the
literature on patent renewals (Shankerman 1998, Lanjouw et al 1998, Pakes and Simpson
1989, just to cite the most prominent). According to that strand of the literature, about
50% of the patents drop out before they reach age ten and only a negligible part of those
remaining reaches the last year of life, the 20th. The last term of the rst equation of (19)
quanties the rate of death induced by the coexistence of preys and predators. The greater
the number of the preys the higher the possibility of hunting for predators, and the greater
the number of predators the greater the number of victims.
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According to this interpretation, the law of evolution of the imitators, namely the imitators
growth rate, is characterized by an exogenous mortality or birth rate, according to the sign g
takes on, and by a birth rate as a function of the number of innovators, c. The term  eMt
acts as reducing imitators growth rate and can be thought of as capturing competition
among imitators.
In the second scenario, we consider the cases in which innovators can somehow "hunt"
imitators. In such cases (19) describes the evolution of two competing species. This oc-
currence can be easily captured by the term d _mdN  0, which, in turn, implies that the sign
of some parameters changes: g > 0 and c  0. This situation can be representative of
economies in which innovators are endowed with e¤ective private and/or public protection
of IPR, or whenever innovations make imitations obsolete. These conditions are more likely
to occur in advanced economies. In other words  c can be thought of as representing the
degree of IPR protection.
4 The solutions of the system
The Volterra system in (19) can be traced back to the family of systems of ordinary di¤er-
ential equations that can be written in a very general form as:
:
xi = xi
"
ri +
TX
k=1
aikxk
#
with i = 1; :::; T
where, according to the notation commonly used, aik are the generic coe¢ cients that de-
scribe the interactions of the variables xi: In our particular case T = 2.
This case has been graphically studied since Volterras pioneering works and analytically
in many other papers. Given the economic essence of the problem, in the following we
will refer to the pioneering work by Goh (1976, 1980), that nds necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the local stability of a so-called "feasible equilibrium", namely an equilibrium
characterized by strictly positive values of the variables.
Let us start by calculating the coordinates of our system equilibria. The system has three
kinds of equilibria: the total extinction equilibrium E0(0; 0), the one-category equilibria in
which only one kind of agents survives and eventually the coexistence equilibrium. The
one-category equilibria are characterized by the following Cartesian coordinates:
EN
r
s
; 0

; EM

0;
g
e

where EN and EM represent the equilibrium in which either innovators or imitators survive,
respectively. In particular EM makes sense only for g > 0.
The coexistence equilibrium is given by:
E = (N;M) =

er   gf
es+ cf
;
gs+ rc
es+ cf

(20)
when the two coordinates are strictly positive.
In order to analyze the property of the system we must study its Jacobian matrix:
J :

r   2sN   fM  fN
cM g + cN   2eM

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calculated at the di¤erent equilibrium points. Thus, for the extinction equilibrium the
Jacobian becomes:
J(E0) :

r 0
0 g

the eigenvalues of which are 01 = r and 
0
2 = g: We assume that r > 0, so the extinction
equilibrium is never locally stable in our model.
For the one-category equilibria the Jacobian matrix are the following:
J(EN ) :
24 r  frs
0 g +
rc
s
35 and J(EM ) :
24r   gfe 0cg
e
 g
35
characterized by eigenvalues equal to N1 =  r and N2 = g +
rc
s
for EN , the equilibrium
with innovators and no imitators, while in the remaining case, EM , M1 = r  
gf
e
and
M2 =  g.
Finally, to study the local stability of the coexistence equilibrium we refer to the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions given by Goh (1976):
 sN   eM < 0 (c:1)
NM(es+ fc) > 0 (c:2)
(21)
where N and M are the amounts of innovators and imitators corresponding to the co-
existence equilibrium (20) when it is feasible, i.e. with positive equilibrium values of the
variables.
According to the discussion of the results obtained in the previous Section, we are interested
in two di¤erent scenarios.
Scen-1 c; e; f; s; r > 0 and no restrictions on g;
Scen-2 e; f; g; s; r > 0 and c < 0;
Scen-1 depicts the situation in which innovators (or more generally innovations) are
regarded as preys and imitators (or more generally imitations) as predators. Scen-2 is such
that the two kinds of agents compete with each other.
It is immediate to prove that for either scenario the extinction equilibrium is never
asymptotically stable. In fact, at least the eigenvalue 01 = r is strictly positive in both
cases. The extinction equilibrium is similar in spirit to the shutdown equilibrium in which
neither innovators nor imitators have any incentive to enter the market and operate. This
rst and very simple result envisages that a shutdown equilibrium in the market of ideas,
although possible from a purely theoretical point of view, cannot be an enduring situation.
In the next Sections we deepen the analysis of the remaining two equilibria, for the time
being we study the relative dimension of N and M, namely the conditions under which
M is greater that N.
Under Scen-1 we can claim that N < M when the following inequality holds:
r
s+ f
(e  c) < g: (22)
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Assuming a positive imitators birth rate, g > 0; a su¢ cient condition requires e < c,
namely the rate at which imitators die out, e; must be less that the rate at which they
thrive hunting innovators, c. Assuming g < 0 the condition e < c becomes necessary, no
longer su¢ cient because it can still occur that e < c but rs+f (e  c) > g, being g < 0.
To discuss Scen-2 it is useful to rewrite inequality (22) as follows:
r
s+ f
<
g
e  c (23)
Notice that the parameters on the left-hand-side, LHS, are all related to innovators. In
particular, the denominator pertains innovatorsdeath rate due to both natural death, s,
or induced by imitators, f . Therefore, we can dene the ratio rs+f as the relative birth rate,
in the sense that births are compared to deaths. Similarly for the RHS.
To sum up, it is possible to claim that the necessary and su¢ cient condition in order to
have N < M is that innovatorsrelative birth rate is less than imitatorsone.
5 First scenario: the prey-predator model
The denition of feasible equilibrium requires E to have strictly positive coordinates, im-
plying the following inequality to hold:
 c
s
<
g
r
<
e
f
(24)
otherwise one equilibrium coordinate, N or M, would be negative. The relations in (24)
states that the ratio g=r rather than the endogenous mortality/growth rates g and r must
be considered in order to identify the feasibility conditions of E.
The inequalities in (24) assure that if the coexistence equilibrium is feasible, then EN must
necessarily be locally unstable given that in order to have a negative value of the eigenvalue
N2 , condition (24) must be violated. Similarly, violation of (24) leads also to a negative
value of M1 . Hence, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Whenever the coexistence equilibrium is feasible, there are no other equi-
libria that can be locally asymptotically stable under Scen-1.
It is worth recalling that both innovation and imitation activities carry out a social
task, being innovation the engine of economic growth and being imitation an easy and
cheap way to di¤use innovation. Therefore, the lack of one of the two populations will
prevent the economy to grow at a substantial rate, di¤erently from a situation of coexistence.
In addition, in the specic case of infringements, namely illegal imitations, since ghting
crime is a costly activity, as rst pointed out by the Nobel laureate Becker (1968), it is
economically preferable a situation in which a certain amount of illegal imitations were
tolerated. In this respect, the stability of the coexistence equilibrium may be considered as
a desirable feature, in that it allows stable economic growth. Hence, Proposition 1 can be re-
phrased in economic terms as stating that whenever it is socially acceptable that imitators
and innovators coexist, this solution is preferable to others in which neither imitators nor
innovators exist.
5.1 Stability of the coexistence equilibrium
It is easy to check that, under Scen-1, the inequalities in (24) imply (c.1) and (c.2) in (21) to
hold. That is, if the coexistence equilibrium is feasible, then both local stability conditions
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apply.
Yet, it is possible to go deeper in the analysis by identifying parameters constellations
under which convergence is oscillating or monotone. In mathematical terms we must check
if eigenvalues are complex or real, respectively.
Even if it is possible to obtain analytical conditions on the parameters pertaining each of the
two cases, their complicated expressions would be hardly interpretable from an economic
point of view. Therefore, we prefer to simulate two examples corresponding to the two
cases, i.e. oscillating or monotonic convergence. In Figure 1-A the phase plane displays
a converging trajectory when the eigenvalues of the feasible equilibrium are complex. We
used the following set of parameters: (c; e; f; g; r; s)=(1:27; 0:28; 2:156; 0:88; 1:9; 0:149).
Figure 1. Oscillatory convergence
Panel A Panel B
Figure 1-B shows the timeplot of both variables converging oscillating.
Figure 2 corresponds to a case in which the eigenvalues of the feasible equilibrium are real,
and the convergence is monotone.
The set of parameters used is (c; e; f; g; r; s)=(0:73; 3:785; 0:96; 1:64; 1:383; 0:21).
Figure 2. Monotone convergence Panel A Panel B Panel C
These two examples show that whenever the parameters of the Volterra system (19) are
such to generate oscillating convergence towards a feasible equilibrium, in the transition
phase innovators and imitators can dominate the other specie. In this respect the ratio
N=M will go through consecutive periods in which it is greater and other lower than unity
(Figure 1). Furthermore, whenever parameters generate monotone convergence, over the
transition phase, the N=M ratio can be either greater of lower than unity, but in this case
the situation N =M can occur at most once (as an example, see Figure 2-C obtained with
this set of parameters: (c; e; f; g; r; s) = (2:62; 3; 0:16; 1:7; 1; 1:34)).
6 Second scenario: the model of competition
Under the competing species case, namely under Scen-2, the coexistence equilibrium has
strictly positive components provided that either:
e
f
<
g
r
<  c
s
(25)
or:
 c
s
<
g
r
<
e
f
(26)
are fullled. Again, these relations involve the ratio between the exogenous growth/mortality
rates g=r.
Conditions (25) and (26) are mutually exclusive. Therefore, we can consider separately the
two sub-cases.
When condition (25) applies the coexistence equilibrium must be necessarily unstable given
that condition (c.2) in (21) does not hold.
At the same time the rst condition of (25) ensures that the eigenvalues of both EN and
EM are all negative. In other words we have a situation of bistability and, depending on
the initial condition, trajectories will converge towards one equilibrium or the other. Figure
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3, obtained with the set of parameters (c; e; f; g; r; s)=( 2; 1; 1; 1:7; 1; 1), is an example of
the shape of the basins of attraction of the coexisting locally stable equilibria. The values
of the point (N0;M0) contained in the dark blue area represent the initial condition leading
to converge to EM , while the points in the light blue area represent the initial condition
leading to converge to EN .
Figure 3. Basin of attraction
Figure 3 reveals that even if E is locally unstable, it still plays an important role. Its
stable manifold separates the two basins of attraction.
This scenario is a quite typical one in cases of competition. It reminds the competitive
exclusion principle or Gauses law, which means that imitators and innovators look like
two species competing for the same resources and a little advantage with respect to the
coexistence equilibrium values is enough to make one specie survive and the other one die
out.
Let us consider now the case in which the coexistence equilibrium is feasible because condi-
tion (26) applies. It is easy to check that the positivity of N, M, s, e and (es+ fc) imply
the local stability of E to hold, according to (21).
The argument put forth so far about the stability of the system in a competing world can
be easily summarized and rationalized as follows. By simply rearranging (26) we have that
a necessary condition for it is the following:
 cf < es (27)
On the LHS of inequality (27) we nd the product between the rate c at which innovators
hunt imitators and the rate f at which the latter hunt the former. Let us dene this quantity,
cf , as the cross hunting rate. On the RHS we nd the product of the two natural death rates,
es. Let us dene this quantity as the cross natural death rate. The comparison between the
two quantities can be regarded as measuring the degree of competitiveness. Accordingly, a
cross hunting rate less than a cross natural death rate can be read as stating that competition
must not be too severe. It is also worth noting that condition (27) implies that  c has an
upper bound, being  c < es=f . Hence, we can claim the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. The coexistence equilibrium, whenever feasible, is the unique locally stable
equilibrium only if condition (27) holds, under Scen-2.
It is commonly acknowledged that innovation is the true engine of economic growth,
but at the same time innovators must not be endowed with too aggressive tools to hamper
imitation activity, otherwise the economic system will go through instability (here as a
metaphor of an undesirable economic situation). In this respect, the economic rational of
Proposition 2 is perfectly in line with that of Proposition 1, but under di¤erent economic
scenarios. A certain amount of competition between the two sub-populations is desirable,
but there must be a limit to the extent to which one population can hamper the others
activity. Accordingly, the upper bound to  c represents an upper bound to the degree of
IPR protection. Finally, recall that in order to have feasible and stable coexistence  c must
lie in the interval 0 <  c < es=f . It is worth noting that this interval is consistent with an
inverse-U shaped relationship between innovation and competition, as found by Aghion et
al. (2005), Furukawa (2007) and many others.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Starting from the model of Dixit and Pindyck (1993) set in a context of dynamic uncertainty
and irreversible investment, we have derived the law of evolution of innovators and imitators
in the market. Their relationships have been studied under two di¤erent contexts: prey-
predator and competition. Analytic results and numerical simulations show that when the
rst scenario applies the coexistence equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium. As far as
competition is concerned, we nd that the conditions for local stability of the coexistence
equilibrium bound the degree of IPR protection. As a result, innovation has an inverse-U
shape as a function of imitation, namely of competition, entailing that a stronger degree of
IPR is not always the best policy to be pursued.
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